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High-Risk Drivers: The Privilege to
Drive Does Not Include a License to Kill
There is no inherent right to drive. Society has a perfect
right to protect itself by regulating who may take a ton or more
of machinery onto public streets and drive it around at 60
m.p.h.. . . Cars can be lethal weapons, and driving is an act of
faith. We all assume that other drivers will stop for red lights,
generally behave rationally and go in the right direction on
freeways. People who are too confused to keep the rules of the
road straight should be prevented from endangering themselves
and everyone else.1
I. Introduction
Our society is concerned with the competency of automobile
drivers on our roads and highways. America's love affair with the
automobile has made it an integral part of our lives. It is viewed not
merely as a mode of transportation, but as a symbol of independence
and freedom. Nevertheless, driving an automobile is a privilege and
not a right. The privilege to drive is regulated in every state and the
District of Columbia, and a driver's license will not be issued unless
the prospective driver can satisfy the respective jurisdiction's statu-
tory requirements.' Unfortunately, the licensing system is fallible
and many incompetent drivers' continue to possess valid driver's
licenses.
Gertrude Karmiol, age eighty-one, of Miami Beach, was driving
twenty-five to thirty miles per hour when she suddenly drove onto
the sidewalk and smashed into crowded bus stop benches." Three
1. A Danger to Us All, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 16, 1985, § 2, at 4, col. 1.
2. "Just as the young person views the license as a rite of passage into the adult world of
independence, so the elderly driver views its loss as a loss of independence and even identity."
Waller, Renewal Licensing of Older Drivers, in TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SPECIAL REPORT 218, 2 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCI-
ETY: IMPROVING MOBILITY AND SAFETY FOR OLDER PERSONS 72 (1988) [hereinafter 2
TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY].
3. Annotation, Denial, Suspension. or Cancellation of Driver's License Because of Phys-
ical Disease or Defect, 38 A.L.R. 3D 452 (1971) [hereinafter Annotation].
4. See infra notes 107-08.
5. In this Comment, the terms high-risk driver, incompetent driver, and unsafe driver
are used interchangeably. The terms refer to a person who, as a result of infirmity, physical
disability, mental incompetence, advanced age, or medication, is not a safe driver and probably
could not pass a properly administered driver's examination, but nevertheless has a valid origi-
nal or renewed license and drives.
6. 60 Minutes: Too Old to Drive (CBS television broadcast, July 31, 1988) (transcript
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people were killed, and five others were injured. Under oath,
Karmiol testified that she did not remember anything about the acci-
dent.8 The records revealed that in the prior thirty-nine months,
Karmiol had caused three different accidents, hit eleven people and
killed three.9 After the third accident, the police advised Karmiol to
give up her license, but she refused. 10 What she did instead was in-
crease the limits of her liability insurance. 1 Yet the authorities
could not revoke her license."
The story of Gertrude Karmiol is not an isolated incident. As a
result of similar tragedies, concern is growing among citizens that
something must be done to reduce the high-risk driver's level of risk
or remove the high-risk driver from the road."a This Comment ad-
dresses the hazards posed by high-risk drivers in general and focuses
on the high-risks associated with the elderly driver. Although age is
not an accurate indicator of driving skill," the physical and cognitive
changes that accompany aging are similar to the physiological and
cognitive difficulties experienced by other types of high-risk drivers.
Thus, a study of the high-risk elderly driver encompasses a majority
of the hazardous conditions caused by other high-risk drivers.
This Comment identifies the categories of persons who are clas-
sified as high-risk drivers and explores the issue of liability. Addi-
tionally, this Comment surveys proposed risk reduction methods such
as improvements in highway 5 and automobile design, changes in
drivers' licensing procedures and corresponding constitutional con-
cerns, alternate modes of transportation, and risk education. Finally,
this Comment proposes suggestions that legislatures and communi-
ties may want to consider implementing to reduce the hazard
presented by high-risk drivers.
on file at Dickinson Law Review office) [hereinafter Too Old to Drive].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The attorney for one of the women sitting on one of the benches demanded that "the
state should have some sort of mandatory reexamination or some sort of mandatory review for
these people. And if they're not physically and mentally competent to drive an automobile,
they shouldn't be allowed to do so." Id.
10. Too Old to Drive, supra note 6, at 9.
II. id.
12. Id.
13. "A number of groups have been identified as 'greater-than-average risks' on Ameri-
can highways-drinking drivers, teenagers overcome with the power of their car and their first
license, people high on drugs . . . [and] America's elderly." Id.
14. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
15. In this Comment, the term highway is used to refer to interstate highways, turn-
pikes, parkways, roads, avenues, streets, and any other paved roadway.
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II. Classification of High-Risk Drivers 16
A. Drivers with Infirmities or Physical Disabilities
Many diseases reduce a person's physical capabilities to a level
where it is no longer safe for the person to operate an automobile. 7
These diseases include cardiovascular disease, 18 diabetes, 19 epi-
lepsy,2" neurological disorders, 21 vision disorders, 2 breathing disor-
ders, 3 and blackouts.24 Interestingly, a person suffering from an in-
firmity or physical disability such as those listed above will not
automatically be classified as an unfit driver. Rather, license review
boards may consider mitigating factors such as the motorist's com-
mendable driving record,26 the frequency and severity of incapacitat-
ing attacks of unconsciousness or loss of bodily control,2 the motor-
ist's ability to compensate for the physical disability,2 7 and the
motorist's ability to predict and control a recurring condition. 8
16. This Comment is concerned with individuals who are high-risk drivers because of
conditions, infirmities, and physical disabilities beyond their control. This focus precludes a
discussion of the danger posed by drivers who are voluntarily intoxicated or under the influ-
ence of illegal drugs. The difficulties that a handicapped driver may encounter are also ex-
cluded from consideration. For the effects of medication, see infra note 40 and accompanying
text.
17. The requisite type and extent of proof needed to prove the existence of an infirmity
or physical disability is not within the scope of this Comment.
18. Cardiovascular disease may be more prevalent than previously believed. Cardiovas-
cular disease includes heart attacks, strokes, and other diseases associated with arteriosclerosis,
hypertension, and high blood pressure. Annotation, supra note 3.
19. A diabetic can be a high-risk driver, since a diabetic may be susceptible to sudden
lapses of consciousness that can accompany hypoglycemic reactions to insulin dosages. Id.
20. The disabilities associated with epilepsy are similar to those experienced by a dia-
betic. An epileptic whose condition is not controlled by medication may suffer sudden convul-
sions, unconsciousness, and other behavioral abnormalities. Id.
21. Neurologic disorders, including diseases or defects of the central nervous system,
may be so severe or may have an accompanying paralytic condition such that a person with
such a disorder would be incapable of driving. Id.
22. When a person's vision fails to meet the minimum licensing vision standards, that
person should no longer drive. 20/20 vision is not required in both eyes. Id. See infra note 117
for an explanation of visual functions.
23. People who suffer from sleep apnea, a breathing disorder that causes people to stop
breathing intermittently while they sleep, are seven times more likely to have an automobile
accident. Studies indicate that these people often fall asleep at the wheel. Indeed, sleep apnea
could be the cause of thousands of the two million automobile accidents that occur each year,
since as many as one percent of the population of the United States may be afflicted. Sleep
apnea can be successfully treated by having the sufferer lose weight or wear a device that aids
breathing during sleep. Thompson, Breathing Disorder Cited in Auto Wrecks, Washington
Post, Mar. 1, 1988, § H, at 5, col. 1.
24. When a person is susceptible to fainting or blacking-out, he or she should not be
permitted to drive. In re Hennessy License, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 99, 101 (1963).
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B. Elderly Drivers
1. Physiological Reasons for High-Risk.-The elderly driver
may suffer from numerous physiological and cognitive disorders that
accompany the aging process and affect driving performance. Age
alone, however, is a poor indicator of the presence of these factors.
"Not everyone will experience these problems, and there is nothing
to say that elderly drivers can't drive as well as anybody else."'"
Physical skills such as eyesight, reaction time, depth perception and
hearing diminish with age.30
In order to understand why diminished physical skills can ad-
versely affect a person's ability to drive safely, one must understand
the task of driving and its dependence on physical skills. Driving an
automobile consists of four phases: (1) the driver must see or hear
the situation in which he or she is driving; (2) the driver must cogni-
tively recognize the situation; (3) the driver must decide how to re-
act to the circumstances; and (4) the driver must execute the physi-
cal maneuver. The limit of a driver's visual, auditory, cognitive, and
motor skills affects how well the driver can perform each of these
phases."1
As a person ages, visual ability declines s2 and such common
problems as cataracts, glaucoma, increased sensitivity to glare and a
decreased ability to focus on both static and dynamic objects occur.3"
In addition, the elderly driver's night vision becomes less acute 4 and
hearing diminishes, especially for high-pitched noises, such as car
horns, train whistles, and sirens.35 Thus, with diminished visual and
hearing acuity, the aging driver has more difficulty performing phase
one of the driving task.
29. Elder, Older Drivers: Just How Safe?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1987, § C, at 15, col. 3.
30. Wade, Back to School for Older Drivers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1988, § 5, at xx3, col.
1; TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SPECIAL REPORT
218, 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY: IMPROVING MOBILITY AND SAFETY FOR
OLDER PERSONS 1 (1988) [hereinafter I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY].
31. The first phase requires perception at the visual or auditory level. The second and
third phases are at the cognitive level. The fourth phase is at the motor level. I TRANSPORTA-
TION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 54-55.
32. See infra note 117 for explanation of various visual functions.
33. Sixty-eight percent of those aged 65 to 75 have a corrected static acuity worse than
20/20, as compared with 13% in the 18-24 age group, 16% in the 24-34 age group, 15% in
the 35-44 age group, 29% in the 45-54 age group, and 44% in the 55-64 age group. Bailey &
Sheedy, Vision Screening for Driver Licensure, cited in, 2 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING
SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 294.
34. Brody, Taking Heed of the Caution Signals on Declining Skills as American Driv-
ers Grow Older, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1988, § B, at 15, col. 2 [hereinafter Brody].
35. Id. at col. 2-3.
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One's cognitive capabilities also diminish with age. The ability
to focus attention on a task declines with age3" and an older person
is more easily distracted. 7 Additionally, an older person's ability to
judge the distance between objects wanes, and the driver may incor-
rectly estimate the velocity of oncoming vehicles. 8 Older persons
cognitively process information at a slower speed and experience
memory loss, which, if severe, is termed dementia. 9 Many widely
prescribed drugs may also impair the cognitive process.40 The decline
in cognitive ability from all of these factors affects driving phases
two and three.
The ability to perform motor skills also declines with age. These
changes, however, appear to be small and can be compensated for
with practice."1 An increase of pathological conditions - such as
arthritis, stroke, or Parkinson's disease - can limit a driver's coordi-
nation, range of motion, and strength. Reaction time also slows with
age."' This decline in motor capability affects phase four of driving.
Elderly drivers also risk incurring more serious injuries when
they are involved in automobile accidents.' 3 This greater risk is the
result of biomechanical changes that accompany aging: bones be-
come more brittle, joints become less resilient, and atheroma of the
arteries increases the probability of blood loss."
2. Demographic Reasons for More High-Risk Driv-
ers.-Today, society is giving more attention to elderly drivers be-
cause of the changing demographic profile of the population. There
are now about 18.5 million drivers over the age of sixty-five, about
fifty percent more than ten years ago.' 5 In 1984, about twelve per-
36. I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 58.
37. Id. at 59.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 59-60. About 55% of dementia cases are caused by Alzheimer's disease. Id. at
60.
40. The elderly comprise II % of the population, but they purchase 25 % of both pre-
scription and over-the-counter drugs. "In addition to the danger posed by the direct effects of
these drugs is the increased danger from different pharmacological reactions and interactions
among drugs." McKnight, Driver and Pedestrian Training, cited in, 2 TRANSPORTATION IN AN
AGING SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 109. Medications may cause "drowsiness, confusion, diffi-
culty in concentrating and visual disturbances." Brody, supra note 34, at 15.
41. I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 60.
42. McKnight, supra note 40, at 107.
43. In a crash, the probability of death increases with increasing age. Drivers sixty-five
and older are five times more likely to die in a crash than are drivers under the age of twenty.
Waller, supra note 2, at 80.
44. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 61.
45. Too Old to Drive, supra note 6, at 10; Schmidt, Graying of America Prompts New
Highway Safety Efforts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1988, § A, at 17, col. 1.
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cent of the population was over the age of sixty-five. As the Baby
Boom generation ages, the historic population pyramid will become a
population rectangle with about an equal number of people in each
age group. By the year 2020, about twenty percent of the population,
or 50 million people, will be age sixty-five or older." About 22 mil-
lion over the age of seventy-five will be eligible for a driver's license
and 7 million of these will be eighty-five or older."7 Moreover, as
health care improves, an increasing number of people will live
longer. 6 For example, the group of persons age eighty-five and older
is growing rapidly and is expected to triple in size by the year
2010.
49
Thus, it is possible that advances in medicine may reduce the
number of drivers whose high-risk is attributable to infirmities or
physical disabilities. The most likely scenario, however, is that the
change in the demographic profile of the population will outpace
these advances, and the number of high-risk drivers will continue to
increase.
C. Drivers Who are Habitual Offenders
An habitual offender is often classified on the basis of points as
one who "has been convicted with such frequency of serious offenses
against traffic regulations as to indicate a disrespect for traffic laws
and a disregard for the safety of others." 50 Drivers in this category
often suffer from emotional disorders that cause them to be psycho-
logically unfit to drive.5 1 Also, some people have personality charac-
teristics that are associated with an increased risk of hazardous
driving.52
Young drivers are often considered to be the highest-risk drivers
based on accident statistics.3s These statistics, however, do not indi-
cate that each driver under the age of twenty-five is a high-risk.
46. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 1, 21-22; Schmidt,
Graying of America Prompts New Highway Safety Efforts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1988, § A, at
17, col. I.
47. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 8.
48. Id. at 21.
49. Id. at 22.
50. State ex rel. Griffith v. Brustkern, 202 Mont. 438, 439, 658 P.2d 410, 411 (1983).
51. A routine psychiatric survey of traffic violators showed that II % of the violators
were not fit to drive because of personality traits including feeble-mindedness and insanity. As
the Plaintiff Drives, So He Testifies, 30 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 11 (1983).
52. Waller, supra note 2, at 84.
53. "Teenagers and those in their twenties have the highest traffic fatality rate per
10,000 persons in each age group, about 4 deaths per 10,000 population." I TRANSPORTATION
IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 37-38.
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While many are responsible motorists, others are overwhelmed with
their new found freedom.54 The high risk associated with these driv-
ers, however, is not generated by an infirmity or physical disability.
D. Liability and Damages Issues
Any discussion of high-risk drivers must consider the issue of
liability. When one person's negligence risks the physical safety of
others, case law suggests that the injured person should have a rem-
edy.55 For example, in accidents such as the one involving Gertrude
Karmiol," few persons would disagree that someone should be held
liable for the harm resulting from her irresponsible driving. The
thorny question is, who is that someone? Several theories of liability
have been advanced in response to this question.
1. Theories of Liability.
(a). High-Risk Drivers.-The imposition of liability upon
the high-risk driver is usually dependent upon the driver's knowledge
of his or her condition, infirmity, or physical defect creating the risk.
The general rule is that courts will not impose liability in negligence
upon a driver who loses control of an automobile and causes an acci-
dent unless the driver knew, or should have known, of the condition
or disability that caused him or her to lose control.57 The defendant
bears the burden of showing that the incapacitating attack or illness
was unforeseeable.5
Drivers who pose a high risk because they unknowingly suffer
from an infirmity or physical defect are incapable of mitigating the
risk. Therefore, if this type of high-risk driver cases an accident, it
will probably be considered an act of God.59 For those drivers who
know that they suffer from an infirmity or physical disability, such
as susceptibility to heart attack, diminished vision, or propensity to
black-out,60 and nonetheless continue to drive, perhaps the courts
54. Too Old to Drive, supra note 6, at 6.
55. See infra notes 60, 83-85, 90-97 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
57. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 29 (5th ed. 1984). A
sudden loss of consciousness while driving is a complete defense to an action based on negli-
gence, if the loss of consciousness was not foreseeable. Annotation, Liability for Automobile
Accident Allegedly Caused by Driver's Blackout, Sudden Unconsciousness, or the Like, 93
A.L.R.3D 326 (1979).
58. See, e.g., Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
59. An act of God is "[a]n act occasioned exclusively by violence of nature without the
interference of any human agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 31 (5th ed. 1979).
60. See Lutzkovitz, 339 A.2d at 64 (holding that a defendant who blacked out prior to
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should impose strict liability and allow plaintiffs to pray for punitive
damages. 1
For some categories of high-risk drivers, the issue of liability is
less clear. For example, drivers with character disorders or those suf-
fering from Alzheimer's disease may lack the capacity to realize that
they pose a danger to others. Without knowledge of the danger, the
law is hesitant to impose liability 6 2 although one could strongly ar-
gue that it should. In addition, there is a category of high-risk driv-
ers whose dangerous propensities can be mitigated. These drivers in-
clude those who have disabilities that can be effectively and safely
controlled through medication63 or other techniques.6
(b). Physicians.-Both statutory and case law have ad-
dressed the role that a physician should assume in detecting and re-
porting high-risk drivers. At one time, all states had medical advi-
sory boards consisting of specialists in fields such as neurology,
cardiology, and vision care.65 The purpose of such boards was "to
assist driver licensing personnel in establishing standards for licens-
ing all drivers and determining appropriate restrictions for particular
drivers because of medical disabilities." '66 In practice, it appears that
the physicians on these boards merely make educated guesses when
evaluating license applicants, and thus their effectiveness is doubt-
ful.17 In addition, many states no longer have Medical Advisory
Boards or have permitted them to cease functioning. 8
As a result, several states enacted physician reporting statutes,
which require doctors to report the patient to the appropriate author-
ities if the doctor believes the patient is a high-risk driver.6" These
running into the back of the plaintiff's vehicle had the burden of proving such illness or attack
was unanticipatable and unforeseeable in order to avoid liability).
61. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 57.
63. See Ormond v. Garrett, 8 N.C. App. 662, 175 S.E.2d 371 (1970) (holding that
Medical Review Board, which found that the defendant's epilepsy was effectively controlled
through prescription medicine, had no authority to deny his driving privilege).
64. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
65. I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 92. For a representa-
tive statute, see UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6-118 (Supp. 1976).
66. Garfinkel, Should You Be Required to Report Potentially Hazardous Drivers?, 8
LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 17, 18 (Jan. 1980) (quoting Traffic Laws Commen-
tary, Medical Advisory Boards, U.S. Dept. of Transp. 1(1):1 (1972)).
67. Id.
68. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 92.
69. States can also have permissive or no reporting requirements. For example, Florida
imposes the duty of permissive reporting and states that "Any physician, persons, or agency
having knowledge of any licensed driver's or applicant's mental or physical disability to drive is
authorized to report such knowledge ...." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.126 (West Supp. 1988).
Kansas declines to impose liability if a physician fails to report a high-risk driver. The perti-
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statutes, however, may be less effective than the legislatures desired
them to be. First, if a patient fears that a physician may report him
or her as a high-risk driver, then that patient may be deterred from
visiting the physician.7 0 The result could be to place one more high-
risk driver on the road, a situation that is contrary to the goal of the
statutes. Second, physicians may be inclined to oppose mandatory
reporting statutes because of their allegiance to physician-patient
confidentiality.71 The public interest in having a physician report a
high-risk driver, however, may outweigh the physician's interest in
confidentiality. 2
The courts have also addressed this issue.73 They have held that
a physician who negligently fails to warn a patient that a medication
or physical condition makes driving unsafe may be held liable for
injuries to third parties.7 ' In Thompson v. Davis, the court stated
that a physician has a duty to warn the patient, but has no affirma-
tive duty to prevent the patient from driving.75 Thus, once the physi-
cian notifies the patient that he or she should not drive, the physician
will not be held liable if the patient disregards the warning.76 Such a
holding presumes that the patient is mentally competent. 77 If, how-
ever, a physician knows that the high-risk driver will not heed his or
her advise, then perhaps a physician may still be held liable since the
patient's failure to refrain from driving was foreseeable. 8
If a patient is mentally incompetent, the physician may have an
affirmative duty to warn potential victims or prevent the patient
from harming third parties .7  In Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California,"0 the Supreme Court of California recognized
that a psychotherapist has a duty to use reasonable care to protect a
nent statute states that "[n]o physician shall be required by law to volunteer information to
the division or to the medical advisory board as to the mental or physical condition of any
patient." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-255(c) (Supp. 1987).
70. Garfinkel, supra note 66, at 18.
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id.
73. See generally Annotation, Liability of Physicians for Injury to or Death of Third
Party Due to Failure to Disclose Driving-Related Impediment, 43 A.L.R.4TH 153 (1986).





78. See Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: AIDS and the Conflicting Physician's
Duties of Preventing Disease Transmission and Safeguarding Confidentiality, 76 GEo. L.J.
169, 176 (1987).
79. See generally Annotation, Liability of One Treating Mentally Afflicted Patient for
Failure to Warn or Protect Third Persons Threatened by Patient, 83 A.L.R.3D 1201 (1978).
80. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rtpr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
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third party from harm when the therapist has notice that a patient
presents a serious danger to that intended victim. 81 Such a duty is
imposed, however, only when the defendant "stands in some special
relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be con-
trolled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that con-
duct." 82 The duty recognized in Tarasoff was generalized in Lipari
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,83 in which the court held that a physician
will be held liable if the physician could "reasonably foresee that the
risk engendered by his patient's condition would endanger other per-
sons."84 Courts have recognized an affirmative duty to warn or con-
trol in other relationships as well. 6
Physicians do have several potential defenses to avoid liability
stemming from such incidents. If a physician establishes that the
plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable, the physician would not be lia-
ble in a contributory negligence jurisdiction or would be entitled to a
reduction in the damage award in a comparative negligence jurisdic-
tion.86 The doctrine of assumption of risk may preclude a physician's
liability if the patient was capable of knowing and understanding the
hazard he or she would pose on the highway and voluntarily chose to
incur the risk.
87
In light of the availability of such defenses, a physician may be
held liable for negligently failing to warn a patient that driving
would be unsafe. If the patient were unable to heed the warning, or
the physician knew that the warning would be disregarded, then the
physician may be liable for failing to report the patient to the licens-
ing agency, because the Tarasoff requirement that victims be fore-
81. Id. at 431, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20, 551 P.2d at 340.
82. Id. at 435, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 551 P.2d at 343 (citations omitted).
83. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
84. Id. at 194. See also Willis v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. La. 1987); but
see Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. Md. 1982) (holding that psychiatrists had
neither the right nor the ability to control patients' conduct so as to give rise to a duty to warn
others of a patient's dangerousness).
85. A duty to warn has been found in the attorney-client relationship if the attorney
obtains information directly from the client, and the attorney is convinced that the client in-
tends to commit a crime or inflict injury upon unsuspecting third persons. Hawkins v. King
County Dep't of Rehabilitative Servs., 24 Wash. App. 2d 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979). A duty to
control exists in the parent-child relationship if the parent has the opportunity to exercise the
control and knows that such control is necessary. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316
(1965). Liability has also been impose on bar owners, social hosts, and employers who are
negligent in preventing patrons, guests, or employees from drinking and driving. See generally
Note, When the Party's Over: McGuiggan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 86
BU.L. REV. 193 (1988). See also Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that physicians have an affirmative duty to prevent the spread of infectious or conta-
gious diseases by warning third persons).
86. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 57, at §§ 65 & 67.
87. Id.
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seeable is clearly met. 88 In addition, injury to third persons resulting
from a collision with a high-risk driver would be the proximate result
of the physician's failure to warn. Thus, even though requiring a
physician to report a high-risk driver may breach physician-patient
confidentiality, "confidential . . . communications must yield to the
extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others."8 9
(c). Government.-Courts are increasingly willing to hold
state governments liable for the negligent licensure of high-risk driv-
ers.9" In First Insurance v. International Harvester,9 ' a truck
crashed into an automobile, resulting in fatalities and serious inju-
ries. The truck driver, who lost control of the truck when its brakes
failed, had been issued an operator's license by the City and County
of Honolulu without any examination of his competency as a truck
driver. 92 The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the City and County
of Honolulu owed a duty93 to the public to examine and certify a
driver's license applicant.94 The court also explained that when the
government fails to conform to a standard of care and honor its duty
to the public, the government can be held liable in tort.95 Although
there are cases that have reached the contrary result, 98 commenta-
tors have suggested that governmental liability for the negligent issu-
ance of a driver's license to an incompetent driver by a state or
county official "is likely to be the rule, not the exception, in the
future."97
88. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 20, 551 P.2d 334, 343 (1976).
89. Id. at 442, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27, 551 P.2d at 347.
90. Waller, supra note 2, at 83.
91. 66 Haw. 185, 659 P.2d 64 (1983).
92. Id. at 191, 659 P.2d at 68. Governmental liability can be imposed for the negligent
issuance or renewal of a driver's license, "this distinction is not a distinguishing factor in deter-
mining the presence or absence of a duty." Note, First Insurance v. International Harvester:
Government Liability for Negligent Issuance of Drivers' Licenses, 7 U. HAw. L. REV. 193, 207
n.73 (1985).
93. See Note, supra note 92, at 204.
[The court] defined duty by balancing the interests of individual and public
safety against the interest of strictly limiting the city's liability in tort actions.
Presumably, when a particular plaintiff's injuries are serious enough so that the
public interest in safety overrides any concerns regarding infringement upon the
city's activities, a court will create a duty and impose liability.
Id.
94. First Insurance, 66 Haw. at 192, 659 P.2d at 69.
95. Note, supra note 92, at 205.
96. Id. at 209. See e.g., Cady v. Arizona, 129 Ariz. 258, 630 P.2d 554 (1981).
97. "[The] trend will be for courts to impose liability when government officials 'rou-
tinely or perfunctorily' issue licenses to incompetent drivers." Note, supra note 92, at 213
n.105.
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(d). Family.-Public policy may not favor the imposition
of liability on family members who fail to report a high-risk driver.
Since professionals have difficulty determining the risk an individual
poses to society,98 it might be unreasonable to expect a lay person to
correctly identify high-risk drivers. Nevertheless, the option of re-
porting a high-risk driver to the state's licensing agency is available
to family members. Family members, however, hesitate to report an
individual since such action may often cause a permanent rift in the
family. 99 The reported driver will be summoned to take a driving
test, and in most states, they will be told who made the report. 00
Consequently, few high-risk drivers are reported by their families. 101
Further, if a reported high-risk driver passes the driving test admin-
istered by the licensing agency, the regulations often say that the
person may never be challenged again.102
2. Damages.-It is well-established that a person may main-
tain an action for compensation for injuries he or she suffers as a
result of another's negligence." 3 Additionally, some victims are enti-
tled to punitive damages. Punitive damages are intended to punish a
defendant and are only imposed against a tortfeasor who intention-
ally or deliberately commits a particularly egregious act.10 4 Com-
mentators have suggested that driving while intoxicated is an act for
which punitive liability may be appropriate.'0 5 Similarly, it can be
argued that a person injured by a high-risk driver should be allowed
to seek punitive damages against a physician who negligently fails to
report a high-risk driver, a hazardous driver who knows of his or her
disability but voluntarily chooses to drive, or a state government that
negligently issued or renewed the incompetent's license. In determin-
ing the propriety of punitive damage awards in such cases, courts
98. See generally Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 439 (1974).
99. Opsata, Older Drivers and Safety: The Tough Choice, 28 50 PLUS 34-35 (Feb.
1988).
100. Id. at 35. In New Jersey, any report of a high-risk driver is kept confidential, and
the Division of Motor Vehicles sends the reported driver a medical form that must be com-
pleted by a certified physician. Conversation with an official of the New Jersey Division of
Motor Vehicles (March 1988).
101. Opsata, supra note 99, at 35.
102. Id.
103. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 57, at § 2.
104. Id.
105. "Public policy supports the imposition of punitive liability for reprehensible, deter-
rable acts of high cost to society. Under the conscious disregard standard, exemplary damages
are appropriate when the defendant has volitionally acted, or failed to act, with actual knowl-
edge of the probable harmful consequences." Note, Punitive Damages in California: The
Drunken Driver, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 793, 820 (1985).
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must focus on the issue of whether the actions of the physician,
driver, or government are sufficiently egregious and socially costly to
justify such sanctions.
Alternatively, society may choose to compensate the injured
party by increasing the availability of insurance compensation rather
than imposing liability on the tortfeasor. Suggestions for improving
the available automobile insurance for a victim include removing un-
insured drivers from the highways and providing insurance from the
injured person's own insurer if the tortfeasor is uninsured.10
III. Current Efforts to Make the Road Safer
A. Legislation
1. State Drivers' Licensing Statutes.-The motor vehicles
codes of the fifty states and the District of Columbia offer a variety
of approaches to both the issuing107 and renewing'08 of driver's li-
106. See generally Comment, The Continuing Search for Solutions to the Drinking
Driver Tragedy and the Problem of Social Host Liability, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 403 (1988).
107. ALA. CODE § 32-6-4 (1983); ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.05.041, -15.031, -15.111 (Supp.
1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-413-422 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-16-801, (Supp.
1987); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 12805, 12811 (Deering Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-103
(1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-36 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2713 (1985);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-301 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.12 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 68B-203, -209 (Harrison 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 286-104-108 (1985 and Supp.
1987); IDAHO CODE § 49-306 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, 99 6-103, -110 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1988); IND. CODE § 9-1-4-30 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. 99 321.177, -.186 (West 1985
and Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-235b, -237 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.410
(Baldwin 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402, 409 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 29 § 530 (Supp. 1988); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 16-103, -111 (1987); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 8 (West Supp. 1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.2003, -.2010 (Callaghan
Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.04, -.07 (West Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 63-
1-5, -9 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.060 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-5-
102, -105 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-407 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 483.250, -.340
(Michie 1986 and Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 263.6, -.50 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN..
§§ 39.3-10, -10b (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-5-5, -15 (1978); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW §§ 501-02 (McKinney 1986 and Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-7, (Supp.
1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-06-03, -14 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.21 (Baldwin
1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 6-103, -111 (West 1988); OR. REV. STAT. 99 807.040,
.060 (1987); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1510 (Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS 9 31-10-26
(Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 32-12-17 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-331 (Supp. 1988); TEX. VEH. CODE ANN.
§§ 6687b-4, -11 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-2-109 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 603 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-368 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4.20.120, -. 161 (1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 17B-2-7, -8 (1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 343.05,-.06
(West Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. § 31-7-115 (Supp. 1988).
108. ALA. CODE §§ 32-6-3, -4 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.101, (Supp. 1988); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-426 (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-16-801, (Supp. 1987); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 12814.5 (Deering Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 42-2-110-116 (1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-36b (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2713 (1985); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-301 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.12 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §
68B-213 (Harrison 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-107 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 49-322 (1988);
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censes. °9 Some states have modeled their motor vehicle statutes af-
ter the Uniform Vehicle Code." 0 The Uniform Vehicle Code pro-
vides that a motor vehicle department "shall not issue any driver's
license to, nor renew the driver's license of, any person: . . .7. When
the commissioner has good cause to believe that such person by rea-
son of physical or mental disability would not be able to operate a
motor vehicle with safety upon the highways.""' Under the Code, if
a driver is convicted of certain offenses, including vehicular homicide
or manslaughter, the department is authorized to revoke his or her
license."' Additionally, a department may require a driver to submit
to a reexamination if it has good cause to believe that the driver is
incompetent." 3 Further, the Code provides that once a driver's Ii-
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 6-115 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE § 9-1-4-34.1 (1987);
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 321.196, (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-247 (Supp. 1988); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.410 (Baldwin 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 408 (West Supp. 1988);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29 § 542A (Supp. 1988); MD. TRASNP. CODE ANN. § 16-115 (Supp.
1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 8 (West 1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2009 (Calla-
ghan Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.13 subdiv. 2 (West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-
1-49 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.173 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-111
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-411.01 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 483.380, -.386
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 263.7, -. 10 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39.3-10 (West
Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-21 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. VEIl. & TRAF. LAW § 502 (Mc-
Kinney 1986 and Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-7(d) (Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-06-19 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.09 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§§ 6-115.1, -.2 (West 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 807.150 (1987); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1514 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-10-30 (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-
210 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 32-12-42, -43 (Supp. 1988);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-338 (1988); TEX. VEH. CODE ANN. § 81 (Vernon Supp. 1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-2-125 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 632 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §
46.1-380.1 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 46.20.120-181 (Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE §§
17B-2-7-12 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.16 (Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. §§ 31-7-114, -119
(Supp. 1988).
109. This Comment does not include a discussion of the statutory requirements for re-
stricted licenses. A restricted license is typically issued to a driver who requires special
mechanical control devices to aid his operation of a vehicle. For a representative statute on
restricted licenses, see CAL. VEH. CODE § 12813 (Deering 1984).
110. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE (Supp. 1976).
Ill. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6-103(b)(7) (1986).
112. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6-205 (1968 and Supp. 1976) provides in relevant part:
§ 6-205-Mandatory revocation of license by department
The department shall forthwith revoke the license of any driver upon receiv-
ing a record of such driver's conviction of any of the following offenses:
1. Homicide by vehicle (or manslaughter resulting from the operation of a
motor vehicle);
Id.
113. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6-207 (Supp. 1976) provides in relevant part,
§ 6-207-Department may require examination
(a) The department, having good cause to believe that a licensed driver is
incompetent or otherwise not qualified to be licensed, may . . . require him to
submit to an examination. Upon conclusion of the examination, the department
shall take action as may be appropriate and may suspend or revoke the license
Id.
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cense expires," 4 the driver must retake a vision and knowledge exam
and any other examination that the department deems "reasonably
necessary" in order to renew the license. 1"'
The federal highway safety standard for issuing drivers' licenses
provides guidance for the license renewal." 6 States, however, vary in
their implementation of the renewal procedure regarding the length
of time for which a license is issued, vision standards," 7 testing of
road knowledge, 1 6 testing of ability to understand traffic control sig-
nals," 9 road testing,1 0 and requirements for medical evaluations.
The American Association of Motor Vehicles Administrators reports
that only forty-one jurisdictions require periodic reexaminations of
114. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6-115 (1968) provides in relevant part,
§ 6-115-Expiration and renewal of license; re-examination required
(a) Every driver's license shall expire on the licensee's birthdate in the (sec-
ond, third, fourth) year following the issuance of such license ....
Id.
115. Section 6-115 of the UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE (1968) provides in relevant part,
§ 6-115-Expiration and renewal of license; re-examination required
(b) The department shall require every person applying for renewal of a
driver's license to take and successfully pass a test of his eyesight and knowledge
of the traffic laws of this State. The department may require any applicant to
take and successfully pass such additional tests as the department may find rea-
sonably necessary ....
Id.
116. The federal highway safety standard for driver licensing suggests that the reexami-
nation should
- Occur at least every 4 years before license renewal,
- Include testing for visual acuity at least and for knowledge of rules of the
road,
- Be designed to identify driver deficiencies and limitations,
- Provide remedial measures for applicants with such deficiencies and
limitations,
- Include provision for terminating the driving privilege of those who are
unable to meet safe driving standards, and
- Provide remedial procedures for improving driver performance by refresh-
ing the driver's knowledge and educating him in areas unknown to him.
Waller, supra note 2, at 73.
117. Many vision functions can be tested. Those commonly tested include: (I) static
visual acuity-the ability to discriminate fine, stationary, high-contrast details; (2) dynamic
visual acuity-the ability to distinguish detail in moving objects; and (3) visual field-the
degree of arc that a person sees when looking straight ahead. I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AG-
ING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 55-57. The primary vision examination in the Untied States
tests only static visual acuity. Bailey and Sheedy, Vision Screening for Driver Licensure, cited
by 2 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 296.
118. In this Comment, the term knowledge test applies to that part of the driver's li-
cense examination that tests the applicant's knowledge of safe driving practices and the traffic
laws of the state.
119. In this Comment, the term sign test applies to that part of the driver's license
examination that tests the applicant's ability to read and understand official traffic-control de-
vices such as signs and traffic lights.
120. In this Comment, the term road test applies to that part of the driver's license
examination that tests the applicant's ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control in the
operation of an automobile.
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all drivers.1" Moreover, although most states issue a driver's license
for a term of four years, four issue licenses for five years,12 2 two issue
licenses for three years,' 23 and two others issue them for two
years. 21
Vision exam requirements are equally diverse. Thirty-nine juris-
dictions require that all renewal applicants pass a vision exam.' 25
The usual standard for static visual acuity is "20/40 vision with both
eyes open for licensure without restriction to corrective lenses."'" 6
Most states do not require testing for visual field, dynamic visual
acuity or depth perception. 7
Only a few jurisdictions require renewal applicants to pass a
knowledge and sign test. 28 The necessity of administering sign and
knowledge tests can be based on whether the applicant has accumu-
lated a threshold number of points.'29 A road test is not required for
routine renewal by any jurisdiction. One state, however, institutes
the road test at age sixty-nine, and three others begin road testing at
age seventy-five. 30
A medical examination is not required for routine renewal by
any jurisdiction.' 3 ' Pennsylvania, however, requires a medical exami-
nation when an applicant first applies for a driver's license.3 2 A re-
newal applicant is required to submit to a medical examination start-
ing at age seventy in the District of Columbia and at age seventy-
five in Louisiana. 33 Some states have a Medical Advisory Board
which provides expertise to the licensing authority on medical ques-
tions relating to an applicant's ability to drive safely.'3
121. Waller, supra note 2, at 73.
122. ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.101 (Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412 (West Supp.
1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-10-30 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-380.1 (1986).
123. IDAHO CODE § 49-319 (1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.117 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
124. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-16-801 (Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-19 (1987).
125. Waller, supra note 2, at 74.
126. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 49-326 (1988); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-110.1
(1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.175 (Vernon Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-220 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-357.2 (1986).
127. For an example of a state that requires extensive vision testing, see MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 16-110.1 (1987).
128. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 9-1-4-34.1 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-247() (1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-1-210 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-2-125 (1988);
WYo. STAT. § 31-7-119 (Supp. 1988).
129. IND. CODE § 91-1-4-34.1 (1987).
130. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 6-109 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
131. Waller, supra note 2, at 74.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See. e.g., MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-118 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-6
(1978); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1517-18 (Purdon Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-
357.2 (Supp. 1988).
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Most of the states that have special provisions for licensing con-
centrate their efforts on the renewal of licenses for elderly drivers.
For example, one state allows licenses to be renewed by mail as long
as the applicant is under age sixty-nine. 3 5 Another allows mail-in
renewals for drivers under age seventy. 136 Some jurisdictions shorten
the renewal term upon reaching a certain age. For example, in Iowa,
anyone over the age of seventy must apply for a license renewal
every two years instead of the usual four.8 7 In Indiana, those drivers
over seventy must renew their license every three years, rather than
the usual four.' 38 In 1985, Oregon began the first program to screen
and privately counsel elderly drivers who may no longer be compe-
tent. This program attempts to deal compassionately with older driv-
ers by reviewing their situation on an individual basis." 9
Not all provisions that place restrictions on the license renewal
for the elderly are wanted. For example, in Florida a bill that would
require more frequent testing of older drivers was defeated on the
ground of discrimination on the basis of age. 40
2. Constitutionality of the Statutes.-The fourteenth amend-
ment provides procedural due process protection to certain property
interests.'" Thus, the extent of fourteenth amendment protection to
be afforded a driver's license hinges on two issues. First, a driver's
license must qualify as a constitutionally protected property interest.
Second, if a driver's license is constitutionally protected, the nature
of the procedural due process must be determined.
(a). A Driver's License Is An Important Property Inter-
est.-Classification of a driver's license as a right or a privilege has
been addressed in both state driver's licensing statutes and case law.
The plain meaning of the statutes is clear: a driver's license is a priv-
ilege and not a right.'
4 2
Courts have discussed whether a driver's license is a property
135. ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.101 (Supp. 1988).
136. CAL. VEH. CODE § 12814.5 (Deering Supp. 1988).
137. Schmidt, Graying of America Prompts New Highway Safety Efforts, N.Y. Times,
April 6, 1988, § A, at 17, col. 5; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-41a (West 1987);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-106 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-19 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §
31-10-30 (Supp. 1988).
138. Opsata, supra note 99, at 35.
139. Schmidt, supra note 137, at 17, col. 4.
140. Id.
141. See infra note 150.
142. See e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1541 (Purdon 1977) (discussing the period of
revocation or suspension of a driver's operating privilege).
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interest in the context of the fourteenth amendment. " " In Board of
Regents v. Roth,14 the Supreme Court considered whether a
teacher's interest in being rehired constituted a property interest in
the context of the fourteenth amendment. In concluding that such an
interest is not entitled to procedural due process protection, the
Court gave an extensive discussion of constitutionally protected
property interests. The court stated, "Property interests, of course,
are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or under-
standings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of en-
titlement to those benefits."14 5 Before a person can have a property
interest in a benefit, the person "clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of enti-
tlement to it.
'" 6
In Bell v. Burson,"7 the Supreme Court addressed directly the
issue of whether a driver's license is a property interest in the con-
text of the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated that once a
driver's license is issued, the license becomes an important interest
that is entitled to fourteenth amendment protection. 4 Additionally,
other courts have held that the high-risk driver's procedural due pro-
cess rights outweigh the state's interest in the preservation of safety
on its roads." 9
(b). Procedural Requirements of Notice and Hear-
ing.-Since a driver's license is a property interest entitled to four-
teenth amendment protection, it is necessary to determine the nature
of the procedural due process required to satisfy that protection.
143. See generally Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 435 (1971); Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp.
383 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
144. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
145. Id. at 578.
146. Id.
147. 402 U.S. 540 (1971).
148. In Bell, a driver's license was essential to the petitioner's occupation. The Court
stated that
[s]uspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of the licenses. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken
away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . . . This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant
constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether
the entitlement is denominated a "right" or a "privilege."
Id. at 539.
149. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
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Challenges to the constitutionality of states' driver licensing statutes
have focused on several issues. First, drivers have questioned whether
a state has the right to require a reexamination. Second, licensees
have questioned whether a state has the right to revoke a driver's
license. Finally, drivers have challenged the notice and hearing re-
quirements that must be satisfied before a license can be revoked.
Particularly, their concern has concentrated upon whether a licen-
see's constitutional due process and equal protection rights are suffi-
ciently protected. 50
Strict construction of the motor vehicle statutes in most states
suggests that states have the right to require a driver to pass an ex-
amination prior to the issuance or renewal of a driver's license.151
For example, the court in Bechler v. Parsekian152 held that, when a
statute does not explicitly specify that the state has the power to
refuse to renew a driver's license, the motor vehicle department ad-
ministrator nevertheless has the power of reexamination as well as
examination. 5 ' The court in Bechler also noted that due to practical
necessities, the state may give periodic reexaminations and may base
one's being subjected to such reexamination upon special classifica-
tions as long as such classifications are reasonable.1
5
4
The clear reading of the statutes also indicates that states have
the right to revoke a driver's license. 5  Such revocations are civil,
not criminal proceedings. 156 They are not intended as punishment
but are designed solely for the protection of the public in the use of
150. Due process and equal protection are guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment,
which states in relevant part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
151. See, e.g., UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6-110(a) (1968 and Supp. 1976), which states
that "It]he department shall examine every applicant for a driver's license." UNIFORM VEHI-
CLE CODE § 6-115(b) (1968 and Supp. 1976) provides that "[tihe department shall require
every person applying for renewal of a driver's license to take and successfully pass a test of
his eyesight and knowledge of the traffic laws of this State."
152. 36 N.J. 242, 176 A.2d 470 (1961).
153. "It appears evidence to us that if the Director is to discharge conscientiously his
responsibilities under [the statute], he must have and exercise adequate powers of reexamina-
tion as well as examination." Id. at 251, 176 A.2d at 475.
154. Id.
155. See Bechler, 36 N.J. at 348-49, 176 A.2d at 473-74; see also Kantor v. Parsekian,
72 N.J. Super. 588, 179 A.2d 21 (1962); IDAHO CODE § 49-330 (Supp. 1987).
156. See State ex rel. Griffith v. Brustkern, 202 Mont. 438, 658 P.2d 410 (1983).
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the highways.1 57 While an indefinite revocation does not violate the
eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment, 1 58 a state decision to revoke a driver's license will not be up-
held when the decision is based solely on the driver's appearance of
infirmity due to advanced age.
1 59
The fourteenth amendment guarantee of procedural due process
dictates that a person be afforded the protections of notice and hear-
ing prior to the deprivation of an important property interest.1 60 In
considering whether summary license revocation is to be afforded
due process protection, it must be accorded an individual possessing
the right.161 The Supreme Court, in Bell v. Burson,162 has stated that
a driver's license is an important property interest that requires due
process protection.163 Therefore, the following discussion focuses
upon whether notice and hearing provisions of the applicable statutes
satisfy the requirements of that protection.
The Supreme Court has extensively addressed the due process
requirements of notice and hearing in cases analogous to the revoca-
tion of a driver's license. 64 The Court first mandated that a hearing
precede the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust.165 In Mullane, the Court held
that due process required that a person be provided a "meaningful
opportunity to be heard" prior to deprivation of a protected inter-
157. Ritch v. Director of Vehicles, 194 A.2d 301 (D.C. 1956).
158. The eighth amendment demands that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VIII, § I (emphasis added). When one has consistently demonstrated a total disregard for his
responsibilities as a driver and for the safety of other drivers and pedestrians, he cannot com-
plain when he loses his conditional right to use the highways of the state. See generally Ritch,
194 A.2d at 301.
159. Annotation, supra note 3, at § 14.
160. See supra note 150.
161. Milroy, North Carolina's License Revocation for Drunk Drivers: Minor Inconve-
nience or Unconstitutional Deprivation?, 62 N.C.L. REV. 1149 (1984).
162. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
163. Bell states that a license is an interest requiring procedural due process protections:
Once licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become essen-
tial in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such case the li-
censes are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by
the Fourteenth Amendment. This is but an application of the general proposition
that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitle-
ment whether the entitlement is denominated a "right" or a "privilege."
Id. at 539 (citations omitted). See also supra note 3.
164. See generally Annotation, Necessity of Notice and Hearing Before Revocation or
Suspension of Motor Vehicle Driver's License, 60 A.L.R.3D 361 (1974); Annotation, Suffi-
ciency of Notice and Hearing Before Revocation or Suspension of Motor Vehicle Driver's
License, 60 A.L.R.3d 427 (1974).
165. 399 U.S. 306 (1950).
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est.'"6 Next, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,167 the Court
enunciated the rule that a hearing must be held prior to the depriva-
tion of a person's constitutionally protected interests, except in emer-
gency situations. The Court explained the Sniadach prior hearing
rule in Goldberg v. Kelley.1" Goldberg explained that the interests
of the parties involved are to be balanced within the context of the
Sniadach prior hearing rule.
Bell v. Burson'69 further defined the prior hearing rule and spe-
cifically addressed the interest an individual has in his driver's li-
cense. The Court held that procedural due process requires a state to
afford a driver notice and opportunity for a meaningful hearing that
is appropriate to the nature of the case before revocation of his or
her driver's license, unless an emergency situation exists.170 Cases
following Bell narrowed the Sniadach rule by suggesting that the
provision permitting balancing of.the interests of the parties could be
applied solely to questions regarding the form of a hearing and not
to questions about its timing.171
In 1973, the Supreme Court began to depart from its position
regarding the timing of a revocation hearing, and its decisions subse-
quent to Bell regarding procedural due process requirements for
prerevocation hearings deviate substantially. 7 ' For example, Ma-
thews v. Eldridge17 3 marked a distinct departure from the Bell line
of reasoning. In Eldridge, the Court outlined criteria for determining
whether a prior hearing is necessary.17 ' Although Eldridge involved
166. Id. at 314.
167. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
168. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
169. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
170. "[I]t is fundamental that except in emergency situations ...due process requires
that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford
'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termina-
tion becomes effective." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (emphasis in original) (addressing
the constitutionality of the revocation of a driver's license when the license was essential to the
driver's livelihood).
171. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1970). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
73 (1972) (reconfirming the Boddie rationale).
172. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (modifying Mitchell); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419
U.S. 379 (1974) (confirming the Mitchell use of a balancing test to determine a timing issue);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1973) (balancing the interests of the parties in
determining the timing issue).
173. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
174. The necessity of a prior hearing is to be based on the weight of three factors:
[Flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action, sec-
ond, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail.
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the procedures required for the termination of disability insurance
benefits, the Court applied the Eldridge balancing test to summary
drivers' license revocations in Dixon v. Love. 175 In Dixon, the Court
held that a summary driver's license suspension or revocation is not
necessarily a denial of procedural due process, 178  and later, in
Mackey v. Montrym,17 the Court suggested that a summary suspen-
sion of a driver's license does not offend procedural due process if
there is a provision in the statutory scheme that provides for an im-
mediate post-suspension hearing. 17  Further, Mackey suggested that
the proper weight to be given the individual's interest in retaining his
driver's license is determined by two factors: the possibility of retro-
active compensation and the length of the deprivation of the driver's
license prior to a hearing.1 79 Mackey concluded that an individual's
interest is "substantial" in nature since he or she cannot be retroac-
tively compensated for the revocation of a driver' license.1 80
Mackey represents the current standard for procedural due pro-
cess concerns of state driver's licensing statutes. 8" Current statutes
providing for the revocation of a driver's license are diverse and may
or may not provide for notice and hearing prior to the revocation of
the license.' As long as such statutes allow for an immediate post-
suspension hearing, those statutes that do not provide for a prerevo-
cation hearing do not offend procedural due process standards.
Therefore, there is no outright fourteenth amendment bar to the en-
actment of statutes that revoke the license of a high-risk driver.
B. Safe-Driving Programs for the Elderly
Not all efforts aimed at eradicating the road safety problems of
high-risk drivers are targeted towards removing such drivers from
the road. There are a growing number of safe-driving programs, and
most of these courses are targeted at the elderly driver.83 The "55
Id. at 335.
175. 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (discussing the suspension of a driver's license after the driver
had three traffic convictions in a 12 month period).
176. Id. at 112.
177. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
178. Id. at 19.
179. Id. at 11-12.
180. Id. at 11.
181. Milroy, North Carolina's License Revocation for Drunk Drivers: Minor Inconve-
nience or Unconstitutional Deprivation?, 62 N.C.L. REV. 1149 (1984). Regarding challenges
other than due process, "[b]oth equal protection and right-to-travel arguments have been prof-
fered, but no court has accepted them." Id. at 1150 n.20.
182. See supra note 155.
183. The American Association of Retired Persons' course, 55 Alive/Mature Driving, is
offered in every state. Opsata, supra note 99, at 36. "Drivers 55 Plus: Test Your Own Per-
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Alive/Mature Driving" course offered by the American Association
of Retired Persons focuses on how the elderly driver can compensate
for the diminished perception, cognitive skills and motor skills. 184
The course instructs students on methods to avoid situations that
might tax their driving ability. 185 Nationwide enrollment in the
courses has been substantial and is predicted to increase in the fu-
ture. " Other safe-driver programs include "Safe Driving for Ma-
ture Operators" offered by the Automobile Association of
America, 8 ' "Coaching Mature Drivers" offered by the National
Safety Council,'88 and those offered by the National Traffic Safety
Institute, Driver Training Associates, Inc., and Safety Training Pro-
grams, Inc. 89
Safe-driver courses are actively encouraged in some states. At
present, twenty-two states permit insurance companies to grant dis-
counts to graduates of safe-driving programs. 190 One state, New
York, sends notice of available safe-driving courses along with a
driver's registration coupon.1 91
IV. Proposed Risk Reduction Methods
Changing lifestyles'99 and a changing demographic profile of
the population' 8 urge that society focus increased attention upon re-
formance," which enables a driver to evaluate his driving habits and overall fitness to drive. Id.
184. Wade, Back to School for Older Drivers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1988, § 5, at xx3,
col. 1.
185. The most common violations committed by older drivers are: (1) failure to yield the
right of way; (2) improper left turn; (3) incorrect lane change; (4) improper passing; and (5)
improper entering and leaving of expressway. Id.
186. The American Association of Retired Persons 55 Alive/Mature Driving program
had an enrollment of over 200,000 in 1986. By 1990, annual enrollment is projected to be
300,000 to 400,000 persons. The annual enrollment of the Automobile Association of
America's Safe Driving for Mature Operators program is about 10,000. The National Safety
Council's Coaching Mature Drivers is a new program. McKnight, supra note 40, at I11.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Wade, Back to School for Older Drivers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1988, § 5, at xx3,
col. 1.
190. The following states mandate a discount on automobile insurance for drivers of all
ages who complete an approved course: Delaware, New York, and Texas. Connecticut man-
dates a discount on automobile insurance for drivers over the age of 62 who have completed an
approved course.
The following states mandate a discount on automobile insurance for drivers 55 and older
who have completed an approved course: Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Flor-
ida, Kentucky, Illinois, Louisana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, New Mex-
ico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
The legislatures of the following states have enacted similar legislation, but the implementing
regulations are not yet in place: Utah, South Dakota, and Alaska. Id.
191. Id.
192. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 21.
193. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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ducing the hazards posed by elderly high-risk drivers. Most of the
changes that have been proposed would benefit all drivers, including
the other types of high-risk drivers.
Society can reduce the risks on highways in several ways, such
as implementing improved highway and automobile designs, enforc-
ing more stringent drivers' licensing procedures, and providing alter-
nate modes of transportation for high-risk drivers who would nor-
mally drive themselves.
A. Improvements in Highway and Automobile Design
The majority of the practices and standards used in traffic con-
trol were first set forth in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices in 1935, and few of the included standards have been revised
since that date.'94 Therefore, there currently exist many areas of
highway design that need improvement, such as highway signs,
markings, and the general layout of highway.
Such advances are particularly important for elderly drivers.
For example, with advancing age, a person's visual acuity often de-
clines.19 Consequently, signs, which are currently designed to be
read at a distance of fifty feet, may be difficult for elderly persons to
read. 9 ' In response to the growing number of drivers experiencing
this difficulty, highway planners can take several steps. First, high-
way planners should design signs using letters that are readable at
eighty feet. Further, they may use multiple signs and thus provide
the driver additional opportunities to obtain the information. 97 As
an aid to night driving, they may construction signs out of high-
grade reflecting sheeting. 19 8 Finally, they may increasingly use sym-
bols in highway signs, since symbols effectively reduce reading
time. 199
Highway planners may also improve highway markings, which
delineate the edges of the highway and lanes. They may use reflec-
tive markings to facilitate night driving,"0 ' and mark wider edge-
lines. These proposals are currently being studied by the Federal
Highway Administration.20 '
194. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 77.
195. Id. at 55.
196. This statistic assumes that the person meets the state's minimum vision standards.
197. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 79.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 80.
201. I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 80.
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Careful planning of the layout of highway lanes is also essential
to highway safety. For example, one of the most difficult driving
tasks faced by the elderly driver is the making of a left turn at an
intersection.2 02 The addition of a left-hand turn lane or the installa-
tion of a left-hand traffic signal at difficult intersections would make
such maneuvers easier.2 °0
Greater vehicle safety may also reduce the risks caused by and
indigenous to high-risk drivers, and such safety can be improved in
two ways. First, in light of the substantial crash protection that seat
belts provide, manufacturers should design seat belt systems that are
easy for the elderly driver to use.204 Second, manufacturers may
wish to improve vehicle headlights.20 5 Since many older persons do
not see as well at night and may be more sensitive to glare,0 6 manu-
facturers should design and utilize headlights that create more illu-
mination and reduce glare.207
B. Changes in Drivers' Licensing Procedures
In the mid-1950s, all states adopted the same minimum stan-
dards for issuing driver's licenses with little regard for procedures for
identifying high-risk drivers. 0 a Consequently, current licensing pro-
cedures are limited in their ability to identify high-risk drivers.20 9
202. Safe-driver programs, such as the one offered by the American Association of Re-
tired Persons, suggest that, if highway traffic is too fast for a driver, he or she should take an
alternate route. If a particular destination requires the driver to make a left-hand turn, the
course recommends that the driver approach the destination by taking three right-hand turns.
Wade, Back to School for Older Drivers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1988, § 5, at xx3, col. 3.
203. TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 82.
204. Mercedes-Benz already offers electronic devices that place the buckle with easy
reach. I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 85. See generally Mac-
kay, Crash Protection for Older Persons, in 2 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra
note 2, at 158.
205. See generally Mortimer, Headlamp Performance Factors Affecting the Visibility
of Older Drivers in Night Driving, in 2 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note
2, at 379.
206. See supra notes 33-34.
207. The following steps are recommended:
I. The glare caused by high-mounted headlights on light trucks and vans
should be ameliorated by a federal standard reducing the mounting height on
light trucks and vans to the range of 22 to 30 in.
2. Better illumination could be maintained if automobile manufacturers pro-
vided wider availability of headlight washers as vehicle options.
3. Individual older drivers can maximize the performance of their headlights
by ensuring that they are kept clean and correctly aimed, and should be made
aware of the need to do so.
I TRANSPORTATION IN AN- AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 87.
208. Because little has changed since these standards were adopted, "[flew states are
prepared for the growing need to screen older drivers to identify those whose declining skills
increase the risk of accident involvement." Id. at 89.
209. Id.
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Further, efforts at improving licensing procedures suffer from com-
peting interests. While licensing authorities are attempting to reduce
examination costs, 10 they are increasingly being held liable for the
licensure of high-risk drivers."
The interest of licensing authorities in reducing costs has gener-
ated new license renewal programs with the goal of lessening the
burden on both the public and the licensing agency by a reduction in
renewal testing. 2 In implementing such reductions, states may
forego retesting of certain abilities. Studies are not conclusive yet on
the effect of eliminating the knowledge test for renewal applicants," 3
and the consequences of eliminating vision reexamination are also
unclear. Even with a vision examination requirement, evidence indi-
cates that only seven percent of the elderly applicants actually obtain
corrective lenses.2
C. Alternate Modes of Transportation
The number of high-risk drivers on the road, and thus their risk,
may be reduced by providing such drivers with alternative forms of
transportation. Presently, about two-thirds of the elderly live in sub-
urbs or rural areas.21 5 Consequently, they rely heavily on their pri-
vate automobiles for their transportation needs. 1 6 Studies indicate
that these trends will continue. 17 Since older drivers are increasing
in number, and some will lose their driving skills at some point, it is
important to consider how their transportation needs can be met
with resources other than the private automobile.
The most significant transportation alternatives to the automo-
bile in order of decreasing preference are walking, public transporta-
tion, taxis, and socially-provided transportation. Walking is a viable
alternative21  but the length of a trip in low-density suburban or
rural areas, is usually prohibitive, especially for the elderly.21 9 Addi-
tionally, there are a safety complications to such an alternative, since
210. Waller, supra note 2, at 81.
211. Id.
212. For example, the renewal term in Arizona was changed recently from three to four
years. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-426 (1976 and Supp. 1987).
213. Waller, supra note 2, at 82.
214. Id. at 83.
215. Rosenbloom, The Mobility Needs of the Elderly, in 2 TRANSPORTATION IN AN
AGING SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 63.
216. See generally, I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30.
217. See Rosenbloom, supra note 215, at 68 for an extensive study on this subject.
218. I TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 95.
219. Id.
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there may be no sidewalks or pedestrian crossings.2 20
Public transportation systems are not designed to meet the
needs of the elderly.2 1 Most systems provide service between the city
and the suburbs, while the elderly usually want to go from one sub-
urb to another.222 Additionally, elderly persons who do live in urban
areas where there is mass transit are often too afraid to leave their
home and utilize the service. 2 8
Taxis account for less than two percent of the total trips made
by those over age sixty.2 24 There are two major problems with utiliz-
ing taxis as a significant transportation alternative for the elderly.
First, taxis are too expensive, and second, they are not widely availa-
ble in suburban and rural areas. Possibly, taxi service could be subsi-
dized for the elderly, since such an alternative would probably be
less expensive than expanding conventional public transportation. 22 5
Currently, the elderly benefit from three types of socially-pro-
vided transportation: informal arrangements between private individ-
uals, formal service by public and private agencies, and formal ser-
vice provided by transit agencies.226 While information on informal
arrangements between private individuals is not available, the data
available on the other two types of socially provided transportation
shows that they provide irregular service and are expensive. 27
Therefore, the author recommends that other forms of transportation
be explored. Such transportation might be provided by volunteer and
family networks, through carpooling among the elderly, and with
subsidized taxi services. 2
D. Costs and Opposition to Change
The above recommendations, however, have associated costs.
Commentators have suggested that those who benefit from the pro-
cedures aimed at reducing the number of high-risk drivers on the
highways - the entire driving population - are the ones who
should bear this financial burden. 29 Such a policy is a sound one for
220. Id.
221. "The problem seems to stem from the orientation of large public transportation
agencies, which is to serve the commuter." Id. at 96.
222. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 29.
223. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 96; Elder, supra note
222, at 15, col. 1.
224. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 97.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 98.
228. 1 TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 99.
229. Id. at 91.
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two reasons. First, a greater percentage of the elderly fall below the
poverty level than any other age group, and therefore they cannot
afford to shoulder the financial burden. 30 Second, "[i]t is in the best
interests of all concerned-the elderly, the family of the elderly, and
the greater society-for older drivers to continue to drive as long as
it can be accomplished in relative safety."23 1
The proposed changes to the highway system will no doubt meet
with opposition. Many would rather take their chances on the
road 2' than pay higher driving costs. Other drivers will raise consti-
tutional issues such as discrimination in opposition to such
changes. 3 Perhaps the biggest stumbling block to implementing
new procedures are the elderly themselves. As they grow in num-
ber, 34 the elderly are an increasingly powerful political group. One
source in fact suggests that the issue of traffic safety be addressed
now, "before you have the huge numbers of senior citizens who
might perceive any attempt to restrict their driving as a threat. 23 5
V. Recommendations for Risk Management
A comprehensive program is needed to address the problem of
high-risk drivers. The highways can be made safer by implementing
changes in several areas. First, state legislatures should adopt
tougher licensing statutes. The licensing examinations should rou-
tinely test more than static visual acuity. 3 6 They should test an ap-
plicant's dynamic visual acuity, vision field, depth perception, night
blindness, hearing, 37 motor skills, ability to read and understand
traffic control devices, and knowledge of the traffic rules.' 38 Addi-
tionally, the standard for visual acuity should have a minimum
threshold of 20/40, and an applicant's failure to meet a particular
standard may dictate that the person should not be issued a license.
230. Id. at 92.
231. Id. at 88.
232. Many people are good defensive drivers. They are able to avoid the accident or
problem caused by the elderly driver. Klein, Motorists - Just When is Old Too Old?, L.A.
Times, Jan. 16. 1986, § 1I, at 3, col. I.
233. See, e.g., Schmidt, Graying of America Prompts New Highway Safety Efforts,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1988, § A, at 17, col. I. The Florida legislature defeated an attempt by
state officials to require drivers over 65 to submit to periodic road tests. Id.
234. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 233. Elderly groups were a powerful lobbying force in the defeat of
the state officials' proposal. Schmidt, Graying of America Prompts New Highway Safety Ef-
forts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1988, § A, at 17, col. I.
236. See supra notes 125-27.
237. But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-1 IA (West Supp. 1988) (requiring a special
driver's license for hearing impaired persons).
238. See supra note 128.
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Alternatively, an applicant may continue to drive but with a re-
stricted license. For example, a person with night blindness should be
authorized to drive only during the day.
Further, states should require in person license renewal every
four years, for those under sixty-five and every two years for those
over sixty-five or those who have a significant number of traffic viola-
tion convictions since the license was issued or last renewed. These
more frequent and in person renewals would enable the licensing ex-
aminer to detect problems as early as possible.
Additionally, improvements in highway and automobile design
may mitigate some of the problems that high-risk drivers encounter
on the road. Highway designers should develop and implement eas-
ier-to-read signs, better marked highways, and distinct left-hand
turn lanes. Finally, manufacturers should develop headlights that re-
duce the problems associated with night driving and glare.239
Society should also strive to develop and provide modes of trans-
portation. If a safe, affordable, and convenient alternatives to the
automobile are available, the high-risk driver may not have to
drive.240 The increasing numbers of the elderly alone virtually guar-
antee a market for public transportation.
Education, too, can be instrumental in making highways safer.
Education may decrease or eliminate many of the high-risk driver's
problems. If the driver's licensing examiner is trained to identify
high-risk drivers, then those drivers may be prevented from receiving
licenses. 41 In light of the effectiveness of safe-driver programs, they
should be expanded, 4' and licensing boards should include informa-
tion about state-approved programs with license renewal notices.
State legislatures may also adopt measures that allow insurance
companies to offer premium discounts to graduates of such pro-
grams, regardless of their age.243
Finally, states need to implement strong deterrence mechanisms
and adequate compensation schemes for those injured in accidents
caused by a high-risk drivers. They should impose severe penalties
upon persons who know or should know that it is not safe for them to
driver but nevertheless voluntarily choose to do so. If a high-risk
driver causes another person injury, the injured party should be able
239. See supra notes 205-07.
240. See supra notes 221-23.
241. This Comment does not address the situation where an unlicensed, high-risk driver
chooses to drive.
242. See supra notes 183-89.
243. See supra notes 190-91.
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to seek punitive damages.2"4 Injured persons should also be able to
impose liability on physicians who negligently fail to warn patients
that their driving would not be safe. If the patient is mentally incom-
petent, the physician should be held liable for failing to report the
patient to the licensing agency.245 Such reporting statutes should also
provide the physician with immunity and require that the report be
kept confidential. Lastly, the states should be subject to liability
when a state agency negligently issues or renews a high-risk driver's
license.24
VI. Conclusion
The increased awareness of the danger posed by high-risk driv-
ers has given rise to a need for the development of procedures that
reduce the risk but also permit people to continue to drive as long as
it is safe for them to do so. The changing demographic profile of our
population indicates that a significant and increasing percentage of
the drivers in the future will be elderly. Consequently, a program
aimed at making the highways safer should concentrate on methods
to reduce the risks associated with elderly drivers. Stricter, more uni-
form statutes for initial licensing and renewal licensing of drivers are
mandated. Moreover, the driver's licensing examination must effec-
tively screen out high-risk drivers.
Risk reduction on the highway is possible through techniques
such as better highway sign design, sharper highway markings, and
improved lane designation. In addition, education can be a signifi-
cant method of risk management. When a person's negligence risks
the physical safety of others, public policy favors providing the in-
jured with a remedy and imposing harsh penalties on the negligent
person, whether it be the high-risk driver, the physician, or the li-
censing state. Constitutionally, a state may refuse to grant a license,
or may revoke one, provided that the fourteenth amendment protec-
tions of notice and hearing are satisfied.
The important public interest in safety on the highway suggests
that these procedures should be adopted by the legislatures and com-
munities of every state and the District of Columbia. The cost of
these procedures may be significant, but the cost of the lives that
244. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
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may be lost if this problem is not addressed immediately will be even
higher.
Ellen H. DeMont

